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Unlike the standard and erroneous practice of using the federal funds rate or 
another intermediate target to measure the monetary policy stance, a new 
procedure is developed using the actual Federal Reserve’s instruments and the 
spread between short-term rates and the discount rate. Accordingly, I estimate 
a time-varying coefficient Bayesian SVAR for the interwar period and 1958-
2007. The new technique unveils a new mechanism operating between Fed’s 
policies and the real economy. The results show that monetary policy was mostly 
irrelevant for the interwar period, but the situation changed after 1958. For this 
last case, however, the new mechanism, which focuses on the cost at which 
banks obtain reserves, explains that positive spreads between the federal funds 
rate and the discount rate contributed to increasing inflation, revealing that the 
“price puzzle” is non-existent.  
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1. Introduction 
 The Great Recession and, inherently, the inability to avoid it supposed, or should have 
supposed, an inflection point. It showed that monetary policy, as a tool to achieve central 
banks’ goals, was not managed correctly and therefore not properly understood. That lack of 
understanding means that our knowledge about the channels whereby monetary policy operates 
must be incorrect at some stage. To address that issue, this paper takes not only a step forward, 
but also to the side, uncoupling from the standard and widespread approach to measuring the 
impact of monetary policy on the real economy. The step forward is materialized in the review 
of the Federal Reserve’s history from its early days to the years prior to the Great Recession, 
regarding how this institution and its members reacted to political and economic events, how 
those actions supposedly influenced the American economy’s performance and how monetary 
policy evolved until the years prior to the Great Recession. Thus, while the literature has 
focused only on certain periods of interests, the purpose of this review is to draw common 
patterns from the long-term picture and learn how monetary policy instruments were used and 
interacted with inflation, output and the money supply. Once a better understanding of the 
Fed’s instruments is acquired, the step to the side is inevitable and supposes the major 
contribution of this paper. The federal funds rate, another short-term money market rate or 
reserve measures have been used extensively as Fed’s instruments in the literature to analyze 
the monetary policy stance and its impact on the real economy; however, by definition, they 
are intermediate targets. The actual instruments are open market operations (henceforth OMO), 
the discount rate and the reserve requirements ratio 4 . The conceptual mistake and the 
subsequent erroneous use of intermediate targets to measure the monetary policy stance 
introduce bias into the model (explained in section 2) and provide the wrong conclusions in 
relation to the impact of Fed’s policies on the economy. Moreover, the correct use and 
understanding of the actual instruments, and the incentives they produce for the banking sector, 
inevitably lead to the creation of a new variable that measures arbitrage opportunities for bank 
reserves and provides an explanation for the known price puzzle, whereby when interest rate 
are raised, inflation increases. Therefore, the novelty of this paper is the analysis of longer 
periods with the use of the actual instruments and the new variable. The new set-up facilitates 
the study of and shed new light on the relationship between instruments and the real economy, 
and potential regime changes in Fed’s policies. As a result of measuring monetary policy stance 
																																																								
4  After the 2008 crisis, new instruments were incorporated. See 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policytools.htm. 
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correctly, a new hypothetical mechanism whereby monetary policy operates is discovered. This 
mechanism focuses on the source from where banks obtain reserves, and how the different cost 
of each source has a different impact on the economy. It also provides an explanation for the 
price puzzle and claims that there is not puzzle, but bad policies applied by the Fed, when it 
allowed positive spreads between short-term rates and the discount rate. 
 While a vast literature exists covering how the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy 
stance has influenced the American economy’s performance, references to the instruments 
have been used only and occasionally for those analyzing the interwar period, although from a 
narrative perspective; whereas to the best of my knowledge, there is no reference to the 
instruments for the second half of the twentieth century, despite the use of advanced 
methodologies. For the interwar period, Miron (1988) focused on monetary aggregates, and 
referencing how the Fed used the discount rate, he claimed that Fed’s policies might have 
created more volatility in inflation and output during the 1920s and part of the 1930s. Bordo 
(1993) analyzed and compared how different monetary regimes determined the evolution of 
real variables. By estimating a bivariate VAR on the price level and output, he stated, “the gold 
standard and interwar period emerge as a relatively unstable period stressed by widely 
dispersed supply shocks” (Bordo 1993, p. 16). For those attributing the responsibility for the 
Great Depression, the debate has focused on whether the death of Governor Strong produced 
a change in policy implementation, mostly when using OMO, although also commenting 
changes in the discount rate. For example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bordo and Schwartz 
(1999) and Hetzel (1985) considered Strong’s years as governor of the New York Fed as a 
period of mostly successful monetary policy, but, once he died, those who opposed his ideas 
took charge, which could have created or worsened the Great Depression. On the other hand, 
Wicker (1965), Brunner and Meltzer (1968) and Wheelock (1989, 1990) argued that, had 
Strong lived during those years, the outcome would have been the same, as the policies were 
already ineptly administrated during his lifetime. By looking at the evolution of some real 
variables, market rates, the discount rate and OMO, Hamilton (1987) concluded that despite 
the slight change in policies during the 1920s, it was insufficient to explain the Great 
Depression and that some other factors were involved. Along this line and as exception in 
methodology, Ritschl and Woitek (2000) estimated a BVAR, using non-borrowed reserves, the 
discount rate or the short-term money market rates to measure the impact of monetary policy 
on real variables. They found that positive shocks to the discount rate and intermediate targets 
had, in general, a positive impact on inflation (price puzzle) and negative on output. They 
concluded that the monetary policy before the stock market crash did not cause the recession. 
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At most, it could have produced a mild recession, which is also in line with Temin (1973). For 
the period after 1933, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Orphanides (2004) claimed that, 
despite the Fed’s inactivity during those years, the inflow of gold was the factor guiding the 
well functioning of the economy.  
 For the second part of the twentieth century, since the Fed recovered its 
independence from the Treasury in 1951, the literature has been approaching Fed’s monetary 
policy stance rather methodologically and mainly immersed in the “good luck, good policy” 
debate5, which is also related to monetary policy switching regimes. At the same time, this 
literature gathers common characteristics, such as the use of VARs and the controversy about 
the price puzzle. As commented previously, the use of the federal funds rate as Fed’s 
instrument has been the common procedure to evaluate monetary policy actions and I will 
specify when some variations are applied.  On the one hand, some authors have focused on 
Fed’s responses to movements in output and inflation. Such is the case of Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (2000) using a GMM for a monetary policy reaction function. They observed that a 
policy change occurred during the Volcker–Greenspan era. This change is assumed to have 
brought stability to the economy, avoiding the indeterminacy equilibria existing before the 
Volcker era, by responding more aggressively to inflation. With a similar model, Favero and 
Rovelli (2003) obtained analogous results. Cogley and Sargent (2005), applying a similar 
model to the one in Canova and Gambetti (2009) indicated below, but using the 3-month 
Treasury bills rate, observed changes in the Federal Reserve’s stance toward inflation, but 
their conclusion was not decisive in disentangling the good luck from the good policy 
hypothesis. Orphanides (2004b), comparing Taylor rules with real data and the data available 
for the Fed, claimed that bad policies played a relevant role during the Great Inflation, as the 
Fed wrongly understood how the economy worked, mistakenly predicting larger output gaps 
and intervening in the economy more than necessary, thus creating instability. Once it focused 
on inflation rather than the output gap, and the interventions became fewer and more accurate, 
the situation improved.   
 On the other hand, the object of study is rather the effect of positive shocks to the 
federal funds rate or a similar variable, on the real economy and money aggregates. Firstly, 
however, the use of VARs is evaluated. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) examined VAR 
models of different sizes and trusted more those that included more variables, arguing that the 
																																																								
5 This debate evaluates whether the American economy’s performance has been the result of Fed’s policies or 
external shocks. The main focus is on the pre- and post-Volcker era. 
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VARs supporting the good luck hypothesis, which contain fewer variables, are naïve models; 
Benati and Surico (2009), who, using a New Keynesian model via Bayesian methods, whereby 
they moved from determinacy to indeterminacy states, were able to demonstrate that those 
works based on VARs and supporting the good luck hypothesis may have misinterpreted good 
policy as good luck. In this case, inflation responded negatively to a positive nominal interest 
shock. Beyond VARs evaluation, Boivin and Giannone (2006), who used an SVAR, founded 
that a positive shock to the federal funds rate originated a price puzzle when analyzing the 
inflation responses, whereas output responded negatively. With a VAR, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) found that the Federal Reserve’s activism declined in the late 
1960s and was neutral in the early 1970s. Then, the Fed became passive for the remainder of 
the 1970s, not increasing the federal funds rate enough to counteract inflation. In 1981, 
monetary policy became activist again until Greenspan’s term, when it decreased slightly but 
regained strength since 1993.  By using alternatively the federal funds rate or nonborrowed 
reserves, a positive shock to these variables showed mostly a negative impact on the money 
supply and output, and initially no effect on inflation, which turned negative after roughly a 
year. However, when commodity prices were excluded from the estimation, a price puzzle was 
found. Primicery (2005), using a time-varying coefficient Bayesian structural vector 
autoregression (TVC-BSVAR), argued that, despite observing a change in monetary policy, it 
was not significantly different between the pre- and post-Volcker periods, and Canova and 
Gambetti (2009), with a similar method, found that the policy was the same for both periods, 
showing that the Taylor principle was not satisfied in any of the periods and that the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation remained stable over the periods 
analyzed, but inflation’s persistence changed over time. For the former, a small price puzzle is 
found depending on the period, which disappears quickly, while for the latter, both, inflation 
and output respond negatively to a positive federal funds rate shock. Using a semi-structural 
VAR, including the federal funds rate, nonborrowed and total reserves, Hanson (2006) showed 
that a change in the policy is noticeable after Volcker’s era but that it seems more probable that 
shocks coming from variables such as output or prices were important in determining the 
economic performance. Again, a price puzzle was found. 
 For those analyzing the evolution and volatility of inflation and output, but still using 
the same variables to measure monetary policy actions, Gali and Gambetti (2009), using a 
TVC-BSVAR and analyzing the variations in non-technology and technology shocks, 
concluded that monetary policy could have been among the factors explaining the decrease in 
volatility in output after the Great Inflation. Stock and Watson (2003), examined time-varying 
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standard deviations and VARs with break tests and attributed the reduction of volatility to the 
decrease in shocks but also ascribed 10%–25% of the importance to improved monetary policy. 
Moreno (2004) developed a rational expectations model and showed that CPI inflation 
volatility declined in the 1980s and 1990s because of the propagation mechanism, but, 
considering the GDPD volatility, the decline is explained by smaller shocks. Federal funds rate 
and 3-month Treasury bill rate were used as Fed’s instruments. 
 
 This paper uses the same model as Primiceri (2005), namely a TVC-BSVAR with 
Del Negro and Primiceri’s (2013) corrigendum, but including the actual Fed’s instrument along 
with a variable measuring the difference between the short-term rate of reference for the period 
under analysis and the discount rate.  The results suggest that monetary policy was almost 
irrelevant for the interwar period, as none of the instruments or the new variable is significant 
when analyzing its impact on output and inflation. For the second period, monetary policy 
gains relevance and the discount rate and the spread are able to influence the evolution of the 
variables under analysis. Furthermore, two regimes changes are observed around 1965 and 
1990. While the first one may correspond to a change in Fed’s policies, the second one is 
probably due to a change in the banking sector’s behavior. Last and most important, the use of 
the spread unveils a new mechanism that explains the prize puzzle found in papers such as 
Barth and Ramey (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005), 
Uhlig (2005) and Hanson (2006), among many others. The reason for the creation of this 
variable is that for those periods when this spread was positive, banks had the possibility of 
obtaining higher profits by borrowing more cheaply at the discount window and lending at 
higher rates. The obtaining of cheaper reserves increased the possibility that banks set relatively 
lower loans rates in relation to the raises in the federal funds rate. Consequently, the insufficient 
restrain of credit and the money supply, triggered higher inflation levels. Therefore, I claim 
that there is no puzzle in prices behavior but bad Fed’s policies by allowing those positive 
spreads.  
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework 
necessary to understand the model, which is described in Section 3. Section 4 covers the data 
sources, the identification structure of the VAR and the priors used for the model. Section 5 
analyzes the results obtained. Section 6 gathers all the lessons and patterns obtained from 
section 5. Finally, section 7 summarizes the main conclusions. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
As commented previously, the common way of approaching and evaluating the monetary 
policy stance, in methodological terms, has been the use of the federal funds rate or some 
measure of reserves (typically total reserves or nonborrowed reserves) as Federal Reserve’s 
instruments. By definition, this assumption is erroneous. The federal funds rate or any type of 
reserve measure has always been and will be an intermediate target to achieve a final target 
such as price stability, stable growth or low unemployment. Actually, the Federal Reserve has 
available three instruments to achieve its intermediate and final targets. Such instruments are 
OMO, the discount rate and the reserve requirements ratio. Accordingly, to analyze the Federal 
Reserve’s role and the impact of its policies on the American economy’s performance, it is 
appropriate to use those instruments. In my model, I count with two of them, the discount rate 
and OMO, two intermediate targets, the spread between the short-term rate of reference (call 
loans rate6 or federal funds rate) and the discount rate,7 what is the new variable commented 
above, and M1, and two final targets, the industrial production index (IPI) and CPI inflation. 
The reserve requirements ratio is not incorporated given that it hardly varies over time. 
 To understand why it is erroneous to use of the federal funds rate (or another short-term 
rate) 8  to measure monetary policy, the money market must be conceptualized as two 
submarkets. The first submarket includes the central bank, in this case the Fed on the supply 
side, and the banking sector on the demand side. In the second submarket, the banking sector 
switches to the supply side, the other agents of the economy being the demand side. The Fed 
controls the federal funds rate by purchasing and selling securities in the open market and 
																																																								
6 The call loans rate, for the interwar period, was the most similar rate to the present federal funds rate. “The 
market for brokers’ loans, as it is generally conceived, is centered around the New York Stock Exchange. 
Although some of these loans grow out of a customer relationship between banks as lenders and brokers and 
dealers as borrowers, the majority are made in the open market on a strictly impersonal basis. The market in which 
these loans are made was until recent years the most active and the most sensitive of the money markets of the 
country. It was the market where surplus funds of banks, and sometimes of other lenders, could generally be 
readily placed or from which funds could be quickly withdrawn when needed. Because of the dominance of call 
loans, the branch of the money market dealing in brokers’ loans has been designated as the call money market” 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 1935–. Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, 
1943, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/38, p. 434). 
7 In this case, it is not really an intermediate target but a hybrid between an intermediate target and an instrument, 
because the short-term rate is an intermediate target and the discount rate an instrument. 
8 The same applies to any measure of reserves, as a reserve target will determine the federal funds rate or the other 
way around.	
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increasing or decreasing the discount rate. Thus, the Fed controls the amount (with OMO) and 
price (with the discount rate and federal funds rate) of money in the first submarket, subject to 
the banking sector’s demand for money and subsequent decisions about the federal funds rate 
and to considerations regarding whether that level of demand could harm the stability of the 
economy. Given the price and amount of money set by the Fed, banks will also decide, the 
amount (loans), although just in part, and price (loans rate) of money in the second submarket. 
Unlike Fed’s intentions, banks will set prices and amounts conditioned on their profitability. 
Their decisions about prices and quantities will depend, mainly, on the cost of money to them, 
namely, reserves cost, and the prospect of profits from lending.  
 Thus, the federal funds rate is affected by supply and demand forces in the first 
submarket. The banking sector (as the demand side) will set a federal funds rate depending on 
several factors, such as the demand for reserves necessary to back the amount of loans, banks’ 
surplus reserves, expectations about the adequate level of reserves to hold for the future or their 
own desire regarding the optimum level of reserves held under certain circumstances. 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve (supply side) will target a federal funds rate to control the 
evolution of the demand side by using OMO and the discount rate. However, the simultaneous 
use of both instruments to set the same level of the federal funds rate at two different points in 
time will be different. The reason is that as the federal funds rate depends also on the banking 
sector, the Fed will have to purchase or sell different amounts of securities and the discount 
rate will have to be set at different levels, to provide banks with the required amount of reserves 
determined by the demand forces, under the federal funds rate targeted. In the end, the same 
level of the federal funds rate can produce different equilibria. A greater demand for money 
faced with a greater supply of money can have a price of equilibrium (the federal funds rate in 
this case), which can be the same with a lower demand and supply of money. Nonetheless, this 
lower or greater supply of money will have different effects on the economy, because under 
the same federal funds rate, the cost and amount of reserves provided will have different 
impacts on the loans rate, which in the end, is the rate determining a greater or lower demand 
for loans. Hence, including the federal funds rate in the econometric model to represent the 
monetary policy stance is erroneous, because, by capturing demand and supply forces, the 
supposed policies carried out by the Fed will produce misleading results, as the banking sector 
can, to some extent, modify them and the results will capture those demand side modifications. 
By using the real instruments, Fed’s policies, namely the supply forces, are isolated from the 
demand forces. However, despite being isolated from the Fed’s instruments, the federal funds 
rate entails another problem if included in the model alone. Its impact on the second submarket 
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is relative, as it depends on the discount rate levels. As both rates measure the cost of reserves 
from two different sources, banks will opt for the cheaper cost once arbitrage opportunities 
appear. This is where the new variable (the spread between the short-term rate of reference and 
the discount rate) plays its role. 
 Sometimes, even though the Fed increased the federal funds rate, if the spread between 
the federal funds rate (or another short-term rate) and the discount rate was positive, it offered 
profitable opportunities for banks. Thus, they continued borrowing cheaper reserves at the 
discount window and lending at higher rates than the discount rate. Lending increased or at 
least did not diminish as much as the Fed intended, because with a cheaper source for reserves, 
the federal funds rate was likely to not have a one to one impact on the loans rate, since the 
most important factor determining the loans rate is the cost of money to banks. As the impact 
ratio would be below one, the loans rate could not exert enough restrain on the demand for 
credit. Accordingly, the Fed partially lost the control of its targets. 
 Thus, in the model presented here, while Fed’s instruments capture the supply side of 
the money market, this new variable will be a representation of those periods when banks could 
obtain cheaper reserves and therefore, the loans rate could not be moving one to one with the 
federal funds rate.  Accordingly, positive spreads are likely to exert inflationary pressures, 
while negative spreads will do the opposite once the interest rate is raised, as long as that 
interest rate is high enough to restrain the demand forces. 
2.1 Discarding some concerns 
Given the novel exposure of this mechanism, it is necessary to clarify that this new procedure 
can be applied regardless of the period, the monetary regime or the financial environment. 
 Regarding the monetary regime, the advantage of using real instruments is that the 
analysis of the policies undertaken by the Fed will not be altered by the different active 
monetary regimes during the period of study, because a monetary regime implies an 
intermediate target, such as gold, the money supply, interest rate, reserves, exchange rate and 
so on. Consequently, if an intermediate target is used as a measure of the monetary policy 
stance, apart from the problem explained above about the federal funds rate (which also applies 
to the other intermediate targets), that variable must be removed from the model (a VAR in 
this case) or ordered differently as the monetary regime changes. Conversely, using Fed’s 
instruments, regardless of the monetary regime, the same instruments have to be used to 
achieve both intermediate and final targets. The only way whereby the Fed can achieve its 
goals under any monetary regime goes through the use of the discount rate and OMO. 
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 Concerns may be raised as well about how the financial environment has evolved and 
how it could have modified the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the banking 
sector.  The most important source of change could be Regulation Q, as it imposed interest rate 
ceilings on deposits rates. This regulation was active from 1933 to 1986 but was binding only 
when market rates reached ceiling levels around the 1960s. That meant that banks could not 
offer enough yields to attract depositors. Consequently, saving and loans associations would 
catch those clients. According to Koch (2015), interest rate ceilings contracted banks’ credit 
growth and affected the lending channel, because without more deposits, banks could not 
increase lending. This extra tool included in the Fed’s armory would be, therefore, a significant 
omitted variable once ceiling rates were below market rates. There is, however, a significant 
flaw in the premise that banks need deposits to lend, as banks use those deposits as reserves. 
The reality is quite different. Banks first lend, and just after, look for the necessary reserves to 
back the demand for loans. There is an extensive literature explaining this issue, such as Moore 
(1988), Bindseil (2004) or Jakab and Kumhof (2015) among many others. This fact is also 
supported by some data. In Koch (2015, Figure 1), he displayed when and for how much 
markets rates were above ceiling rates. The periods of higher rates, except for 1960, coincides 
with those periods when the spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate was 
positive (Figure 1). If those periods are now contrasted with Figure 2, where the amount of 
borrowed reserves is displayed, the evidence is clear, as borrowing increased when the spread 
was positive. Thus, even if banks had not been borrowing for the opportunity of obtaining 
cheaper reserves at the discount window, which is the case, the lower amount of reserves from 
deposits could have been counteracted with borrowing and credit would have not been 
restrained. Also, it is not surprising Koch’s conclusion that when the interest rate ceiling was 
binding, credit decreased. As expected, for periods of increased market rates, at some point, 
lending levels will decrease. On top of that, there are also references in Meltzer (2009a, p.470, 
608 and 648) to how banks evaded regulation by offering different kinds of deposits or services. 
However, the reader may be confused when reading that banks complained about ceiling rates 
(Meltzer 2009a, p.383). If they did not need deposits to lend, why did they complain? When 
market rates were above those ceilings, banks could obtain cheaper reserves from deposits, but 
the larger the spread, the fewer quantity of deposits was demanded. Therefore, even if ceiling 
rates were raised and banks 
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Fig.	2	–	Borrowed	reserves	(Billions).	Data	source:	FRED	and	FRASERFigure	2	‐Borrowed	reserves	(Billions)	1 
Figure	1	–	Data	source:	FRED 
Figure	2	–	Data	s urce:	FRED	and	FRASER 
		
	
12
had to pay more to their clients, they could still obtain cheaper reserves than from the discount 
window or the federal funds market.  
 Other source of concern is the evolution of the discount window. There are some 
misconceptions regarding its use and even though the model used in this paper will capture any 
related variation or regime change, a couple of things need to be clarified. First, in 1955, the 
Board issued regulation A, where System orthodoxy was that banks did not borrow for profit 
but only reluctantly for need. Later, the discount rate stopped being a ceiling on the federal 
funds rate. It triggered more borrowing as seen in Figure 2, but the System needed a long time 
until it changed its mind and accepted that banks also borrowed for profits. Therefore, the 
supposed stigma for borrowing for that period is false. Second, the Depository Institution 
Deregulation and Monetary Act of 1980 allowed more institutions access to the discount 
window. Despite this fact, the analysis undertaken here is in aggregate level. That is, before 
some institutions could have access to the discount window, they were likely to borrow from 
the banking sector, which in turn, would borrow at the discount window if more reserves were 
necessary. Hence, no significant regime change is expected under such deregulation act. 
3. Methodology 
The model used in this paper is the same as that in Primicery (2005), a TVC-BSVAR, in which, 
unlike other similar models, not only the coefficients vary but also the variance covariance 
matrix. The code used to estimate the model was downloaded from Gary Koop’s website.9 The 
advantage of this model is that the drifting coefficients are able to capture nonlinearities or time 
variation in the lag structure of the model, while the multivariate stochastic volatility is able to 
capture possible heteroscedasticity of the shocks and nonlinearities in the simultaneous 
relations among the variables of the model. Thereby, it allows the data to determine whether 
the possible variations observed in the relation among variables emanates from the shocks 
(impulse) or changes in the propagation mechanism (response). The adequacy of this model 
for the purpose of the paper is founded on its capacity to capture continuous and smoothed 
switching regimes, unlike those works that modeled time variation with discrete breaks. For 
the topic addressed in this case, it is expected that the Federal Reserve, banking sector and 
other agents of the economy learn from the evolution of the economy and each other. The 
																																																								
9 https://sites.google.com/site/garykoop/home/computer-code-2. 
The only modifications applied to the code are made to adapt it to the data used here as well as for those tools 
necessary for the representation of the results. The process of estimation is entirely as found in the file.	
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learning process is considered to be slow and not to happen overnight. Hence, changes in the 
behavior of those agents, as a consequence of their learning process, will evolve smoothly. 
 
 Using the same notation as Primiceri, the model is the following: 
 
yt  = ct + B1,tyt-1 + … + Bk,t yt-k + ut        t = 1,…, T                (1) 
 
where yt and ct  are n x 1 vectors of observed endogenous variables and a vector of time-varying 
coefficients multiplying constant terms, respectively.  Bi,t, i = 1,…, k, represents n x n matrices 
of time-varying coefficients. Last, ut are heteroscedastic unobservable shocks. The variance 
covariance matrix Ωt is triangularly reduced and defined by  
 
                                  At ΩtA’t=∑t∑’t                           (2) 
 
where At is a lower triangular matrix with ones in the main diagonal, αij,t being the non-zero 
and non-one elements of the matrix. ∑t is a diagonal matrix with σn,t elements in the diagonal. 
Hence, 
yt  = B0,t +B1,tyt-1 +…+ Bk,tyt-k+ At-1∑tεt                      (3) 
V(εt) = In 
Stacking all the Bk,ts in a vector, 
 
Bt = vec(B’t) = [B0,t, B1,t,B2,t,…Bk,t]’ 
 
and with 
Xt=In⊗[1,yt-1,yt-2,…yt-k]’, 
 
the VAR can be represented and modeled as: 
                          yt= X’tBt + At-1∑tεt                          (4) 
 
 Stacking by rows the elements αij,t of the matrix At and the elements σn,t  of the matrix 
∑t, the state vectors or transition equations representing the dynamics of the model are: 
                Bt = Bt-1 + vt                                                                      (5) 
               α t = α t-1 +  ζt                                                                    (6) 
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               log σ t = log σ t-1 + ηt                                                   (7) 
 
where both the Bts and the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix At, α t, follow random 
walks, while the standard deviations of equation (7) follow a geometric random walk, 
accordingly belonging to the stochastic volatility models. The innovations of the model are 
assumed to be jointly normally distributed, supposing the following variance covariance 
matrix: 
 
V = Var ൮൦
ߝt
ݒݐ
	ζt
ηt
൪൲    =  	൦
ܫ݊ 0 0 0
0 ܳ 0 0
0 0 ܵ 0
0 0 0 ܹ
൪                     (8) 
 
where  In  is an n-dimensional identity matrix and Q, S and W are positive definite matrices. 
As Primiceri pointed out, the zero blocks could be replaced by non-zero blocks, but there are 
two reasons for the assumptions taken. First, as Primiceri (2005) already considered the number 
of parameters to be high and adding non-zero blocks would require a sensible prior to prevent 
ill-determined parameters, I include the double of the variables in the model. Second, I do not 
have any structural interpretation to impose on the different sources of uncertainty. S is 
assumed to be block diagonal, with blocks corresponding to parameters belonging to a separate 
equation; that is, the coefficients of the contemporaneous relations evolve independently in 
each equation. For the estimation of the model, I refer the reader to Appendix A of Primiceri 
(2005), taking into account Del Negro and Primiceri’s (2013) corrigendum, whereby the 
algorithm used for the Gibbs sampling undergoes a modification regarding the blocks from 
which the draws are taken. 
 In this model the Bs are restricted to being non-explosive to impose stability. As Koop 
and Potter (2011) (K-P henceforth) explained, “in the absence of such inequality restrictions 
(or a very tight prior), Bayesian TVP-VARs will place a large amount of a priori weight on 
nonsensical paths for the states.” Primiceri used Carter and Kohn’s (1994) algorithm, which 
draws an entire vector of states and rejects any that violate the constraint imposed. The problem 
of applying this algorithm is that, when the number of parameters is relatively high, it is easy 
for the algorithm to become stuck drawing explosive Bs. Thus, all the draws are discarded and 
computation is not feasible, as is the case in this paper for some cases. To solve this problem, 
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K-P developed a single-move algorithm.10 While the MCMC algorithm in Primiceri (2005) 
draws from state space models without the inequality restriction, K-P’s single-move algorithm 
draws from the state space model subject to the inequality restriction, drawing the states one at 
a time. This single-move algorithm does not become stuck rejecting every candidate draw, like 
the multi-move algorithm. It draws Bt from p(Bt|yT, Q, Bt-1),11 accepting the single draw Bt 
with a certain acceptance probability if it has satisfied the restriction imposed. Now, although 
the probability of becoming stuck diminishes significantly, the algorithm mixes more slowly.  
4. Data, identification strategy and priors 
The sample under analysis is split into two periods. The first one covers the interwar period 
with monthly data from 1925:I to 1939:XII, and the second period encompasses the interval 
between 1958:I and 2007:IV with quarterly data. The reason for using different periodicity is 
that for the interwar period the sample size is excessively small if using quarterly data, taking 
into account that a longer sample is necessary for the priors. For the first period, the variables 
used are the Industrial Production Index (IPI), the Consumer Price Index (CPI), M1, the 
difference between the stock exchange call loans rate and the discount rate (C-D), open market 
operations (OMO)12 and the discount rate 13. The first three variables and OMO are growth 
rates, while the spread and the discount rate are in levels. For the second period, the variables 
are the same except for C-D, as the stock exchange call loans rate is substituted for the federal 
funds rate (F-D). While the call loans rate and the federal funds rate represent different 
(although similar) money markets, they perform the same role. In both cases, they represent 
the price at which bank could obtain reserves, when they were not borrowed at the discount 
window. Another difference is that for the interwar period, the Fed did not target short-term 
rates directly as in the second period, when OMO were used for that purpose. However, those 
short-term rates were involuntarily conditioned by the movements in the discount rate 
anyways. That is, the short-term rate responded to demand forces for the interwar period rather 
than to Fed’s desires as in the second period, but still, it was influenced by Fed’s instruments. 
To have all the variables on the same scale, they are standardized (yt -E(yt*))/std(yt*). The order 
of the variables (contrary to that indicated above) takes the IPI as the last variable in the VAR 
																																																								
10 Koop and Potter (2011). Section 2.3, pp. 13–15. 
11 The other blocks are not included in the notation (although they are in the algorithm), as the modification only 
affects the draws of Bt  and Q. 
12 U.S. Government securities (bought outright and repurchases) and acceptances held by the Federal Reserve. 
13 Until 1948, the discount rate belongs to the New York Federal Reserve Bank as representative of all other 
Reserve Banks. Later, all of them offered a homogeneous rate.	
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and the discount rate as the first one. In this way, the relation among the variables has a 
structural interpretation: while the IPI reacts only after one lag to all the other variables’ 
movements, the discount rate reacts contemporaneously to all of them.  The order assumed is 
based on the mechanism described in section 2. The first price that the Fed sets in the first 
submarket is the discount rate. From there, it controls the federal funds rate or whatever 
intermediate target it has through OMO. Even though sometimes OMO and the discount rate 
will move at the same time, the discount rate remain at the same levels for longer periods. 
During those periods, the intermediate target is adjusted through OMO. Both instruments, 
voluntarily or not, will determine the spread. The data were collected from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the Reserve Archival System for Economic Research (FRASER). 
 Regarding the lag structure, I find limitations to this model. Given the high 
dimensionality of the parameters estimated, adding more than one lag in any of the periods 
triggers the draws from the B’s distribution to be non-stationary. Having previously imposed 
the stationarity restriction, the multi-move algorithm used by Primiceri becomes stuck in the 
zone of the distribution where the draws are non-stationary; therefore, no draw is taken. Using 
K-P’s single-move algorithm, I am able to introduce one lag more (including more than two 
lags makes the algorithm collapse). Thus, for the interwar period with monthly data, I use K-
P’s algorithm directly to have at least two lags, which are already few. For the second period, 
I present the results for one lag (multi-move algorithm) and comment the few relevant 
variations obtained with two lags (K-P’s single-move algorithm). 
4.1 Priors and computational details 
For the first period, an invariant VAR from 1920:I to 1924:XII (60 observations) is estimated 
to calibrate the priors’ distributions, while, for the second period, the priors are obtained from 
the period from 1948:I to 1957:IV (39 observations)14. The set-up for the priors (as written in 
Gary Koop’s code) is the following: 
 
B0~N(ܤ෠OLS, 4·V(ܤ෠OLS)), 
A0~ N(ܣመOLS, 4 ·V(ܣመOLS)), 
log σ0~  N(log σෝOLS, 4·In), 
																																																								
14 For the federal funds rate series, data is only available from 1954. As a proxy, I have used the 3-months T-bill 
rate from 1948 to 1954 to estimate the priors. 
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Q ~  IW(k2Q · 60(or 39) · V(ܤ෠OLS), 60(or 39)), 
W ~ IW(k2w · (1+dim(W)) · In, 1+dim(W)), 
S1~  IW(k2s · (1+dim(S1)) ·V(ܣመ1, OLS), 1+dim(S1)), 
S2 ~ IW(k2s · (1+dim(S2)) ·V(ܣመ2,OLS), 1+dim(S2)), 
 
where S1 and S2 are the two blocks of S, A1,OLS and A2, OLS are the corresponding blocks of AOLS 
and kQ = 0.01, kS = 0.1 and kW = 1. Thus, the priors are not flat but diffuse.  
 For the first and second periods, when the single-move algorithm is used, 400,000 
draws are generated, discarding the first 200,000 and using 1 in every 100 to avoid correlation 
between them. For the second period and the multi-move algorithm, 450,000 draws are 
generated, discarding the first 200,000 and using 1 in every 125. The difference in the number 
of draws is explained by the computational time necessary and the percentage of acceptance of 
draws for each algorithm. Regarding the computational time to estimate the model, the multi-
move algorithm required around 60 hours, and the single-move algorithm about 23 days. 
Convergence tests are displayed in Appendix C. 
5. Results  
Even though the results presented in this section are linked to some of the most relevant facts 
within the Federal Reserve, or political and economic events, the reader can examine and link 
those results in greater detail to the narrative of the Fed’s history available in Appendix D. 
 The TVC-BSVAR provides two different tools to evaluate the impact of the 
instruments. First, the impulse response functions will show the posterior mean of the response 
of certain variables to another variable shock. The use of time-varying coefficients allows the 
discovery of whether the interaction between two variables has undergone any significant 
change over the period under analysis. This may be the first hint regarding whether the Fed, at 
some point, modified its policies or used its instruments differently. Second, the posterior mean 
of the standard deviation of the residuals for each equation of the VAR will shed light on 
possible external shocks affecting the results, namely variables that are not included in the 
model, which could distort the relations observed between the instruments and the variables 
under analysis.  
 Before analyzing the results, I advise the reader to pay keen attention to the relations 
described in Figure 3 for the interwar period and Figure 1 for the second period between the 
discount rate, the short-term rate of reference and the levels of inflation, because they are 
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important to understand what the impulse responses display. It needs to be clarified that the 
analysis undertaken intends to comprehend the impact of the instruments on inflation, output 
and the money supply, regardless of the reasons behind Fed’s decisions to use the instruments. 
That is, once the Fed increases the interest rate, because of correct or incorrect forecasts, 
anticipation to political events, international factors or whatever reason, that increase has an 
impact, and that impact is the only thing of interest in this study. This is the only way whereby 
a better understanding of the interaction between instruments and real variables or money 
aggregates can be acquired.  
 Given the detailed analysis of the impulse response functions and the number of figures 
in three dimensions, in this section, I only analyze the response of the final targets to the 
instruments and the new variable. The evaluation of the rest of the figures is available in 
Appendix A. Ordinary impulse response functions to analyze the responses’ significance is 
evaluated only for the relationships between instruments and final or intermediate targets, and 
for selected years. 
 
Figure	3	‐	Source:	Banking	and	Monetary	Statistics,	1914‐1941 (FRASER)	and	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	
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5.1 Interwar period (1925:I–1939:XII)15 
The figures analyzed below display each period of the sample on the X-axis, the response to 
the shock from one to twenty months/quarters on the Y-axis and the scale of the response on 
the Z-axis. 
 
Looking at the discount rate shock (Figure 4.1), the inflation response is positive from 1925 to 
the end of 1929, with the exception of the almost-zero response around mid-1926. The positive 
response coincides with the discount rate being below or near the call loans rate (Figure 3). 
Those positive responses could be also capturing the inflows of gold once the discount rate was 
raised, triggering increases in the money supply and inflation, as long as those inflows were 
not offset. For 1926, the zero response corresponds to the fact that the discount rate was near 
the call loans rate. Between 1930 and 1934, the negative or zero response coincides with the 
facts that the discount rate in real terms was higher than represented because of the deflation. 
Also, it was above the call loans rate. After six months, the response becomes slightly positive. 
From 1934 to 1939, the response is positive but  
																																																								
15 The results shown for this first period belong to the model with monthly data and two lags using K-P’s 
algorithm. Even though the analysis starts in 1925, Appendix D presents the knowledge of the Fed since 1919, 
which is relevant to a better understanding of the policies undertaken later. 
Chart	3	–	Data	source:	FRASER	and	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics
Figure	4.1	‐	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	5.1–	Impulse	responses	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	
lines	depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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becomes negative after two to three months. This time, although the discount rate was above 
or at the same level as the call loans rate, it was mostly below the inflation levels, avoiding an 
initial negative response.  Despite the variations observed, none of the responses are significant 
(Figure 5.1). The response of CPI inflation to an OMO shock (Figure 4.2) is the same for almost 
the whole period: initially positive but negative after two months. The exception is from 1927 
to the end of 1929 (a deflation period), when it is negative. It corresponds to the Fed’s gold 
sterilization. In general, this figure shows that, for the entire interwar period, open market 
purchases had an ephemeral effect.  
For the years 1930, 1931 and 1932, the Fed purchased more intensively than before but the 
consequences of the Great Depression regarding bank failures, a higher demand for excess 
reserves and currency, and gold outflows offset those purchases. After 1933, the Fed was 
relegated to the backseat, the Treasury being mostly in charge of the monetary policy. OMO 
and the discount rate were hardly used since then.  These results are supported by Figure 5.2, 
in which again, a shock to this variable has no significant effect on CPI at any period. 
 Considering the shock to the new variable C-D (Figure 4.3), the response of CPI 
inflation varies depending on whether the spread is negative or positive, whether the economy 
is experiencing inflation or deflation and the position of both rates in relation to the inflation 
levels. 
Fig.	4.2	–	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Fig.	5.2–	Impulse	responses	to	an	OMO	shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	lines	
depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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 When the spread is positive but there is deflation, the response is negative, as for the second 
half of 1925 and between 1928 and 1929. This could mean that the rates were too high. 
Consequently, a larger spread, meaning a higher call loans rate in relation to the discount rate would 
have tightened the economy even more. The response is positive from the beginning of 1926 to the 
beginning of 1928. This was a period with a positive spread (sometimes quite narrow or zero) until 
mid-1927, with both rates around the positive levels of inflation. For the last half of 1927, a larger 
spread would have exerted inflationary pressures, counteracting the deflation triggered by the 
sterilization of gold. From 1930 to 1933, CPI inflation responds positively to an increase in the 
spread, as for the last half of 1927, but under a deflationary scenario. For this period, the spread 
was almost zero or negative. It seems that a positive or less negative spread would have supposed 
an increase in inflation. Related to the last statement, the highest positive peak during this period 
occurs around the beginning of 1933, when the short-term rates increased, as seen in Figure 3. 
However, the Fed did not allow them to be above the discount rate. For the rest of the subperiod, 
the response is mostly positive. 
Figure	4.3	–	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	a	C‐D shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	5.3–	Impulse	responses	to	an	C‐D	shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	lines	
depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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During those years, the spread was zero or negative, but both interest rates were below inflation 
most of the time, which did not contribute to reducing it. For this shock, the response is 
significant, approximately, for the period 1930-1934 and again around 1937 (Figure 5.3). In 
both cases, the spread was negative and there was deflation. Therefore, a lower discount rate 
in relation the short-term rate would have increased inflation. The responses are significant 
from the second or forth month and last beyond twenty months. 
 Focusing now on the responses of the IPI, a shock to the discount rate (Figure 4.4) 
produces quite a homogeneous response for the entire period. The response is initially positive 
but becomes negative after two months. The only difference occurs from 1930 to 1932, when 
the response never becomes negative. Gold inflows and open market purchases could be the 
reason, along with the great decrease in the discount rate. In general, either the transmission 
mechanism of the discount rate towards the output needs more time to materialize or the use 
of two lags with monthly data may not be enough to capture the real effect. Furthermore, its 
impact is not significant for the entire period (Figure 5.1). A shock to OMO (Figure 4.5) has, 
mostly, a positive impact. There is an exception from 1926 to 1930, when the initial response 
is negative for two months before turning positive. This figure has a similar pattern to the 
response of inflation to an OMO shock (Figure 4.2). 
Figure	4.4–	IPI	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Regarding the positive peak seen at the end of 1928, it seems that the Fed purchased more in 
the open market after the crash, but only for some months, because the response becomes less 
positive for the following periods. This is in line with Appendix D. Once more, its effect is not 
significant (Figure 5.2). Regarding a shock to C-D (Figure 4.6), the response is mostly positive 
until 1929. For parts of 1926 and 1927, when the spread was almost zero, the response is 
slightly negative, although only initially.  Afterwards, when the largest spreads are observed, 
the response is positive again. This positive response also occurs during periods of deflation, 
meaning that the spread could have contributed to increasing lending and growth, despite the 
sterilization of gold. After 1930, the response is negative, when the discount rate started to be 
at the same level or above the call loans rate (Figure 3).  Again, the responses are not significant 
at any period (Figure 5.3). The residuals presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are in line with the 
narrative described in Appendix D. For the equations of the final targets, namely the IPI and 
CPI, the residuals are higher during the period in which the Fed was relegated to the backseat, 
after 1933, suggesting that other variables, which are not the Fed’s instruments included in the 
model (as they were hardly used), could be driving the results of that period. Such factors could 
be fiscal policies, gold flows or the devaluation of the dollar in 1934. For the CPI equation, the 
Figure	4.5–	IPI	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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residuals are also higher from 1925 to 1929 (Figure 6.1), likely corresponding to gold flows. 
For the residuals of M1, there is a peak at the end of 1929, probably related to the crash, bank 
failures and holdings of currency, and between the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933, 
when more bank failures occurred (Figure 6.1). Apart from those peaks, the residuals are 
constant for the entire period. For the C-D equation (Figure 6.2), the increase in the residuals 
appears between 1928 and 1930, when the difference between rates was the largest and the Fed 
was unable to reduce the call loans rate because other institutions were giving credit. Regarding 
the OMO and discount rate equations, the residuals behavior is similar to the C-D equation, 
but they start to decrease in 1932 (Figure 6.2). That means that the Fed was targeting other 
variables beyond those included in the model while in charge of monetary policy. According 
to the narrative, the Fed may have been responding to gold flows or bank reserves. Afterwards, 
the residuals tend to zero, as the instruments were hardly used. These results are in line with 
the lack of significance seen in most of the impulses response. 
 
Figure	4.6–	IPI	impulse	response	to	C‐D	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	6.1–	Posterior	mean	of	the	standard	deviation	of	the	residuals	in	IPI,	CPI	inflation	and	M1	equations	respectively.
Figure	6.2–	Posterior	mean	of	the	standard	deviation	of	the	residuals	in	C‐D,	OMO	and	discount	rate	equations	respectively.
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5.2 1958:I–2007:IV16 
For the impulse response function analysis of this second period, I will only analyze the results 
obtained with multi-move algorithm with one lag. The results obtained with K-P’s algorithm 
with two lags are very similar. While the figures are not presented, I will comment the relevant 
variations. 
 This time, I start by analyzing the response of inflation to an F-D shock (Figure 7.1), as 
it provides the perfect beginning for the explanation of the next impulse responses. Until 1968, 
the response of inflation is almost zero, coinciding with the period when the spread between 
the rates was zero or negative. However, that response is not significant (Figure 8.1). From 
1968 to 1982, the response of inflation practically mimics the evolution of the spread (Figure 
1). Thus, when it becomes larger, inflation is higher. Those positive peaks are reversed once 
the spread is zero or negative, and after the federal funds rate has visited maximum levels. 
  
 
																																																								
16 The historical context is in Appendix D and the remaining figures in Appendix A.2. 
Figure	7.1–	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	F‐D	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	8.1–	Impulse	responses	to	an	F‐D	shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	lines	
depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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However, the responses are still positive, as inflation is above both rates. From 1982 to 1990, 
the pattern is the same. However, despite observing even larger spreads, inflation responses are 
not as positive as in the 1970s or early 1980s. For these periods of positive spreads, Figure 8.1 
shows that the spread has a significant and long-lasting impact on inflation. Shortly after 1990, 
around mid-1992, the response of inflation turns negative until the end of the sample. It could 
be expected that, at least in 2001 and 2002, or even 2003, the response of inflation would be 
positive given that inflation is above the discount and federal funds rate, or from 1994 to 2000, 
when, despite not being large, the spread is positive. However, this does not happen and 
coincides with the decrease in borrowing observed in Figure 2. Besides, the responses are not 
significant for this last period (Figure 8.1). 
 Encouraged by this regime change, I discovered some literature that sheds light on it. 
In the Federal Reserve Bulletin of November 1994, Clouse (p. 965), apart from supporting the 
fact that a larger spread led to higher borrowing and that the relationship was quite stable until 
1980, given the failing bank situation during the 1980s and 1990s, stated:  
 
… changes became evident during the 1980s in the willingness of healthy 
institutions to turn to the discount window. Many banks apparently became 
more reluctant to turn to the window for fear of provoking market concerns 
about their financial condition. The greater reluctance to borrow weakened the 
historical relationship between the discount borrowing and the spread of the 
federal funds rate over the discount rate. 
 
Furthermore, “This reluctance became acute during the economic downturn in the 
1990-1991 …” (Clouse 1990, p. 969).  Kasriel and Merris (1982) added that the Fed, 
before 1979, did not pay attention to borrowed reserves and the relation between the 
discount window and the federal funds rate. Pearce (1993) showed that the relationship 
between borrowing and the spread changed under different target regimes. Thus, from 
January 1975 to October 1979, under a federal funds rate target, there was a strong 
nonlinear relationship between the spread and borrowing, whereby a larger spread led 
to higher borrowing, although to a certain extent.17 From October 1979 to October 
1982, under a nonborrowed reserve targeting procedure and lagged reserve accounting, 
																																																								
17	Peristani	(1991)	found	an	S‐shaped	pattern	when	analyzing	the	period	1959–1988.	Thus,	although	the	
spread	led	to	higher	borrowing,	when	the	difference	was	around	4%,	borrowing	hardly,	if	at	all,	increased.	
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the relationship weakened and the amount of borrowing decreased. Last, after October 
1982, under a borrowed reserve targeting procedure and contemporaneous reserve 
accounting, the relationship was even weaker and the borrowing decline more 
pronounced. Therefore, it seems that this negative no significant response and regime 
switch indicate that some factor related to the banking sector triggered that positive 
spreads did not increase inflation. Figure 7.1 also shows that, as commented in the 
introduction, the “price puzzle” is non-existent, because inflation increased with rises 
in the federal funds rate, mostly when the spread was positive and borrowing increased. 
Therefore, there is no puzzle but an inadequate Fed’s policy by allowing those positive 
spreads. The response of inflation to an OMO shock (Figure 7.2) is negative until 1967, 
with the spread being generally negative or zero. Thus, it seems that while the Fed did 
not target short-term rates, purchases in the open markets were scarce to boost inflation. 
Since then, under an interest target and in line with the figure analyzed previously, 
positive peaks occur for those periods when the spread was positive. This means that, 
despite banks already were borrowing, taking advantage of that spread, the Fed 
purchased (although perhaps in a relatively smaller proportion than when the spread 
was zero or negative) in the open market,  
 
 
Figure	7.2–	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	8.2–	Impulse	responses	to	an	OMO	shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	lines	
depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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contributing even more to increasing inflation. Nonetheless, the responses are not significant 
for the entire period (Figure 8.2). The results above support the response of inflation to a 
discount rate shock (Figure 7.3), which is not expected. Its response is negative until 1966, a 
period when the discount rate is either above or equal to the federal funds rate. For the first row 
in Figure 8.3 (1961:Q2), the response is slightly significant. Afterwards, the response becomes 
positive either because, when the spread was narrow or negative, the Fed offset the rises in the 
discount rate by increasing its purchases in the open market (although in those cases the 
positive response was reduced) or because, when the spread was positive, the Fed exacerbated 
the amount of borrowing at the discount window with more purchases. Since positive spreads 
emerged, the discount rate has a positive and significant impact on inflation, except for the last 
years of the sample, when the response is not significant (Figure 8.3). It is important to 
highlight that since 2003, the discount rate was set above the federal funds rate as a penalty 
rate, but it allowed borrowing with no question asked.  
 The response of the IPI to an F-D shock (Figure 7.4) is, for almost the entire period, 
negative and almost proportional to the levels of the federal funds rate. The lowest peaks 
coincide with the highest federal funds rates. Almost similar to inflation, the response is 
Figure	7.3–	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.	
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Figure	8.3–	Impulse	responses	to	a	discount	rate shock.	IPI,	CPI	and	M1	in	columns	1,	2	and	3	respectively.		Note:	The	solid	
lines	depict	the	50‐th	percentile	with	the	16‐th	and	84‐th	percentiles	for	the	dashed	lines.	
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significant from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, with an horizon of two years or more (Figure 
8.1). For the discount rate shock (Figure 7.5), the response of the IPI is positive until 1965 and 
then becomes negative. Since then, as in the last figure, the negative peaks occur around the 
highest peaks of the federal funds rate. For this case, however, the impact is not proportional 
since the beginning of Volcker’s era. After approximately 1970, the responses are significant, 
although most of them just after some quarters (Figure 8.3).  
Regarding the response of the IPI to an OMO shock (Figure 7.6), it is negative with the 
exception at the beginning of the sample, when it becomes positive after two quarters. Similar 
to the last figure, the responses are mostly significant after 1970, although this time they are 
weak and only for one quarter (Figure 8.2). This response is not expected. As explained for 
Figure A.7.11 in Appendix A.2, the transmission between the two variables may need more 
lags, because for those periods when lending was decreasing as a consequence of the high rates, 
what also led to a decline in output, the Fed would have been purchasing more securities to 
decrease interest rates.  
To sum up, a regime change is observed around 1965, when the Fed began to pay attention and 
target short-term rates. The other regime change, although represented not in the instruments’ 
impulse responses but in the spread, is around 1990. Although the figures of the instruments 
mostly maintain their sign and shape since 1965, this happens under different  
 
Figure	7.4–	IPI	impulse	response	to	a	F‐D	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	7.5–	IPI	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	7.6–	IPI	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	9.1–	Posterior	mean	of	the	standard	deviation	of	the	residuals	in	IPI,	CPI	inflation	and	M1	equations	respectively.
Figure	9.2–	Posterior	mean	of	the	standard	deviation	of	the	residuals	in	F‐D,	OMO	and	discount	rate	equations	respectively.
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circumstances. Therefore, a change in the banking sector’s behavior seems to be the most likely 
explanation. This statement is supported by the counterfactual exercise developed in Appendix 
B, where I find no variation in how the Federal Reserve applied its policies for the period under 
analysis, and where inflation expectations are also taken into account. 
For the residuals of the IPI equation (Figure 9.1), an increase is observed at the beginning of 
the sample, which quickly disappears. Thereafter, the residuals maintain roughly the same 
levels, being slightly higher in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. For inflation (Figure 
9.1), the residuals increase in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. This is a period 
when money growth or some type of reserve measure was supposedly targeted. The residuals 
decrease until 2000, to increase again until the end of the sample. For M1 (Figure 9.1), the 
residuals increase in the second half of the 1970s, remain at roughly the same levels until 2005 
and then rise again. While, for the IPI behavior, external shocks could have determined the 
results at the beginning of the sample and slightly during the 1970s and part of the 1980s, the 
residuals of the inflation equation show that external shocks could affect the results in the 1970s 
and since 2000. The same is applicable to M1. Bank reserves and banking sector’s behavior, 
expectations, fiscal policies, exchange rate or political pressures are factors that are not 
included the model and could have influenced the results. For the equations of the Fed’s 
instruments (Figure 9.2), the 1970s also seem to be a period when external shocks could have 
influenced their behavior, as the Fed may have been aiming other targets. The same applies to 
the small peak around 2000, and the rise since 2006.  
5.3 Alternative identifications 
For both periods, alternative orders were tested by locating OMO the first and third in the VAR. 
While most of the responses to an OMO shock change and remain no significant, the 
relationships between the other variables stay almost identical. Another identification scheme 
was tried allowing the instruments and the spread to react contemporaneously to each other 
and imposing zeros in some of the relationships between OMO and the spread with M1 and 
the final targets (so that the decomposition of the variance covariance matrix was no longer 
lower triangular), using the algorithm developed in Canova and Forero (2014). However, none 
of the draws overcame the stationary restriction and the exercise could not be carried out. 
6. What lessons can we learn? 
The picture of monetary policy in the U.S. for the last century shows some recognizable 
patterns in the instruments of monetary policy and intermediate and final targets. Before 
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analyzing the instruments individually, from a general perspective according to the results, the 
Fed’s instruments were not the main drivers of the American economy’s performance for the 
interwar period, while for good or for bad, they gained relevance for the second period. The 
lack of significance obtained for the interwar period is supported with some of the facts 
described in Appendix D, such as the Fed’s inability to differentiate between nominal and real 
interest rates, the lack of experience operating in the open market or the period when the 
Treasury took the responsibility for monetary policy. Also, as commented in the literature 
review, it seems that gold flows had an important role in determining the path of the economy. 
Focusing now on the instruments, I start by analyzing the discount rate.  Its impact on inflation 
varies according to two scenarios. First, when it is above the short-term rate and above inflation 
levels, its impact on inflation is negative. There is an exception for the last years of the sample, 
when its impact is positive but not significant, coinciding with the increase in the residuals of 
the inflation equation. Therefore, other factors could be distorting that relationship for those 
years. The second scenario occurs when the discount rate is below the short-term rate, the 
inflation levels or both. In this case, inflation responds positively. While these patterns were 
also found for the interwar period, the results displayed for the residuals and the narrative 
analysis, seem to explain why those impulses responses are not significant for that period. For 
the IPI, when the discount rate impact has a significant response (what happens only after 
1965), its sign is negative. From 1958 to 1965 the response is positive as in the interwar period, 
although in this last case, the sign is negative after some months. In any case, those responses 
are not significant. The conclusion here is that while no other factor is influencing the 
relationship discount rate-output, increases in the discount rate should decrease output. Last, 
the M1 response is different for each period and could be related to the different Fed’s 
procedure about OMO and targets. One the one hand, for the interwar period (negative and 
significant response) when purchases in the open market were scarce, the discount rate had a 
more important impact on short-term rates and therefore, on M1.  The reason is that short-term 
rates, conditioned on the discount rate but not manipulated by the supply of reserves with OMO 
as under an interest target, responded directly to demand forces, influencing the path of M1. 
On the other hand, around 1965 (positive significant response) the Fed began to target short-
term rates, what required a more intensive use of OMO. As the raises in the interest rates 
intended to reach the Fed’s target were insufficient to restrain the demand for credit and 
inflation continued increasing, to keep the federal funds rate under its target, more purchases 
were needed and the money supply increased along with the discount rate. Despite the more 
“natural” relationship between interest rates and the demand forces for the interwar period, 
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unlike under an interest rate target, the use of the discount rate, implicitly and unwittingly, 
conditioned short-term rates anyways. This mechanism makes both periods comparable despite 
the different targets and short-term rates. 
 
Evaluating the spread, it is the only one having a significant response for both periods in 
relation to the inflation levels. A shock to this variable shows different responses depending on 
the sign of the spread, whether both rates are below or above inflation levels and whether those 
levels are positive or negative. When the spread is positive or both rates are below the inflation 
levels, the response is positive. For the interwar period, those two scenarios had a positive but 
no significant impact on inflation. However, the response was significant and positive as well, 
when the spread was negative for periods of deflation. This suggests that decreases in the 
discount rate in relation to short-term rates would have contributed to increasing inflation. The 
reason why the positive spread had a no significant inflation response for the interwar period 
is probably due to the fact that real interest rates were too high given the levels of deflation, 
which were caused by other factors such as gold sterilization. For the second period, the 
analysis shows that positive spreads above inflation levels contributed to increasing inflation. 
Moreover, it is likely that the banking sector changed its behavior around 1990, because the 
positive and significant responses turned negative and no significant even for periods with 
positive spreads. The different Fed’s procedures explained previously, together with the 
positive and significant responses of inflation when the spread was positive, are in line with 
the fact that M1 responded positively and significantly to positive spreads, despite it implied 
higher rates. Regarding the IPI, increases in the spreads are negative and significant only for 
the period 1965-1990, unlike the discount rate case, in which that significant and negative 
impact was extended to the end of the sample. Therefore, the spread itself seems to not decrease 
output, and the high inflation levels related to that spread could be the cause of that negative 
impact. 
Last, although OMO has a significant impact on the IPI for some periods after 1965, they are 
ephemeral and weak. Therefore, the results suggest that monetary policy can be transmitted 
through prices but not quantities. That is, even though the amount of money supplied will drive 
short-term rates in the first submarket, only interest rates will determine the demand for money 
in the second submarket.  
 
These lessons also provide an explanation for the price puzzle, a problem that has occupied the 
literature for years. Apparently, a shock to the federal funds rate produces, at least initially, a 
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positive inflation response. It has been argued that missing variables and the consequent lack 
of information in VARs produce the so-called “price puzzle.” According to the results obtained 
for the second period (Figure 7.1), most of the increases in the federal funds rate were 
accompanied by large spreads. This led to an increase in money growth and inflation because 
banks could borrow cheaper reserves at the discount window and set a relatively lower loans 
rate. This would trigger a lower restrain in credit than the intended by the Fed. Thus, there is 
not a price puzzle but a real positive relation between the increase in the federal funds rate and 
inflation as a consequence of the bad policies that allowed positive spreads. 
Last, Primicery (2005) used unemployment, inflation and the federal funds rate in his 
model and concluded that the change in policies did not differ between the pre- and post-
Volcker periods, and no regime switch was observed. According to the counterfactual, I reach 
the same conclusion regarding the change in policies for those periods; however, I observe two 
regime switches. The first one is around 1965 in OMO and the discount rate. The second regime 
switch appears in the F-D spread around 1990. In the latter case, it seems probable that the 
responsibility could belong to the banking sector. Apart from that, while Primicery obtained 
standard deviations of the residuals of the CPI inflation equation three times higher in the 1970s 
than at the beginning of the sample, here they are smoother, increasing in 1975 by only half of 
the levels seen in the 1960s. Therefore, it seems that the inclusion of the spread along with the 
instruments explains a great part of the inflation behavior. 
7. Conclusions 
A re-evaluation of the mechanisms operating between the Federal Reserve’s policies and its 
intermediate and final targets is undertaken in this paper, from nearly the birth of the Federal 
Reserve to the period before the Great Recession. For that purpose, however, the standard 
procedure to evaluate monetary policy is questioned and declared erroneous, given the 
measuring problems associated to the use of intermediate targets as Fed’s instrument, and a 
new procedure is proposed. This new procedure uses the actual instruments and the spread 
between short-term rates and the discount rate. Thus, a TVC-BSVAR was performed, applying 
the algorithms already used by Primiceri (2005) and Koop and Potter (2011). To gain a better 
understanding of the results obtained, they were contrasted with a narrative review of the 
Federal Reserve’s history. Summing up, the Fed’s lack of knowledge and inactivity for the 
interwar period, supported by the results, indicated that monetary policy was unable to 
influence output and inflation for that period. After 1958, monetary policy gained power to 
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influence the path of the American economy. However, the management was inadequate and 
the results showed that increasing the federal funds rate is not enough to decrease inflation. 
The increase in the federal funds rate should be accompanied by discount rate increases, 
avoiding positive spreads. Otherwise, they will provide profitable opportunities for banks, 
triggering an increase in borrowing, and preventing enough restrain in the demand for loans. 
The mechanism behind these relationships is that as banks obtained cheaper reserves at the 
discount window, they were likely to raise the loans rate less in relation to the increases in the 
federal funds rate. Consequently, the demand for credit was not restrained as much as the Fed 
intended. These facts deny the existence of the “price puzzle,” as the increase in inflation when 
the federal funds rate was raised was due to bad policies by allowing those positive spreads. In 
the case of aiming to reduce output, it seems sufficient to increase the discount rate. Last, the 
results suggest that the monetary policy transmission channel is effective only through prices, 
even though those prices are driven by quantities and other prices. That is, OMO can modify 
short-term rates, but in the end, the demand side will respond to the price at which money is 
supplied, namely, the loans rate influenced by the short-term rate and the discount rate. These 
results leave open questions for future research as a consequence of the regime changes 
observed around 1965 and 1990. What is the role of the banking sector in transmitting to the 
real economy the monetary policies undertaken by the Fed? Could bank determine the impact 
of monetary policy regardless of the Fed’s intentions and to what extent?  
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Appendix A - Impulse response functions 
	
In this section the reader can find the remaining impulses responses from section 5. Even though 
they are not essential to understand the results obtained, they offer some details about the 
mechanisms working between instruments and final targets. 
 A.1 - Interwar period 
Paying attention to an M1 shock (Figure A.4.7), the response of the inflation shows no clear 
pattern.  Between 1925 and 1927 an increase in the money supply have a mostly positive 
response, although only after one month. During the period when gold inflows were 
accelerating but the Fed was offsetting them (1927-1929), increases in M1 would have 
increased the inflation more than in the rest of the period given the levels of deflation.  From 
1930 to 1933, the response is mostly negative, except for a delayed positive response between 
the second half of 1931 and first half of 1932. The stagnation of business, bank failures, the 
increase in currency and reserves holdings, and the gold outflow, could have contributed to this 
mostly negative response, without forgetting the negative spread. The delayed positive response 
between 1931 and 1932 could correspond to gold inflows and the pressures that the Fed 
received to purchase in the open market. Since 1933 the response of the inflation is initially 
negative and becomes slightly positive after three-five months. Again, accumulation of excess 
reserves, increases in reserve requirements and the negative spread could have contributed. 
 A shock to M1 (Figure A.4.8) shows mostly a negative response of the IPI between 
1928-1929, years of deflation and sterilization of gold inflow. From 1925 to 1927, the response 
is mostly positive, except for the initial negative response in 1925 and part of 1926, again, 
periods of deflation or low inflation. Thus, deflation could have restrained output growth. 
Contrary to those periods of deflation, the response is positive from 1930-1932, (brief open 
market purchases and gold inflows for those years) becoming negative in the second half of 
1932 and having a negative peak in 1933, likely due to banking failures. The negative response 
continues until the end of 1935, slightly after the devaluation and the purchase of silver and 
gold. It turns positive since 1936, when the Treasury desterilized the gold flows from previous 
years. 
 Regarding the impulse responses of M1, a shock to both, the discount rate (Figure A.4.9) 
and to C-D (Figure A.4.11) has a negative response, although for the last  
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Figure	A.4.7	‐	CPI	inflation	impulse	response	to	an M1 shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.4.8	‐	IPI	impulse	response	to	an	M1	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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figure, it becomes positive after two months and it is not significant (Figure 5.3). When the 
shock is to OMO (Figure A.4.10) the response is positive as expected, but not significant 
(Figure 5.2). There is a positive peak in 1929 belonging to the moment when the Fed perceived 
indications of a recession. Accordingly, the Fed purchased in the open market, the money 
supply increased, but it was not enough (as observed in 1.4.2) to increase inflation. Only the 
discount rate has a significant impact on M1 for virtually the entire period (Figure 5.1), except 
for 1930-1932 and 1937, corresponding to the sterilization of gold and deflation periods. For 
the other cases, the responses are significant mostly after the second month and last beyond the 
impulse response horizon. The response of C-D to a discount rate shock (Figure A.4.12) has a 
positive response that becomes negative or zero after approximately nine or ten months, from 
1925 to the end of 1929. This is the period when the discount rate was below the call loans rate. 
From 1930 to the end of 1937 the initial response is negative, becoming positive after 
approximately six to eight months between 1930 and 1934, and one to two months from 1934 
to the end of 1937.  This happens while the discount rate is above the call loans rate. After 1937, 
when both rates were at the same level, the response is negative. Thus, the increase in the 
discount rate led to a relative higher increase in the call loan rate in the first part of the sample, 
and this pattern reversed since then, when the Fed and the Treasury tried to keep short-term 
rates low to finance government spending.  The response of C-D to an OMO shock (Figure 
A.4.13) is negative for the entire period, although for 1928 the response becomes positive after 
two to four months. Therefore, purchases in the open market decreased short-term rates and 
consequently, the spread. Last, the response of OMO to a discount rate shock (Figure A.4.14) 
is negative for the whole period, as it would be expected. 
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Figure	A.4.9	–	M1	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.4.10	–	M1	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	A.4.11	–	M1	impulse	response	to	a	C‐D	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.4.12	–	C‐D	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	A.4.13	–	C‐D	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure A.4.14 – OMO impulse response to a discount rate shock.  Note: Posterior means. 
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A.2 - 1958-2007 
The response of M1 to a F-D shock (Figure A.7.7) is very similar to Figure A.7.1 Thus, for 
those years with positive spread banks increased borrowing and lending, increasing M1. After 
1986, as already commented, there was another large spread. However, as in Figure 7.1, now 
the response is not as positive as in the other cases18. From 1970 to 1990 the positive response 
is significant (Figure 8.1). After 1995, when the spread was positive again, the response 
becomes more positive. Surprisingly, after 2003, although the discount rate was above the 
federal funds rate, and even above inflation after 2004, the response of M1 becomes 
increasingly positive. This time, however, it is not significant (Figure 8.1). The response of M1 
to an OMO shock (Figure A.7.8) has a positive effect for the entire period but is not significant 
(Figure 8.2). The positive peaks occur when the federal funds rate and discount rate are at 
similar levels after their local maximum. This could indicate that when the Fed observed low 
borrowing at the discount window, possibly a signal of low credit growth, it purchased more in 
the open market to boost lending with lower rates. 
 
 This hypothesis is reinforced by the response of F-D to an OMO shock (Figure A.7.9), 
where the positive peaks coincide with periods of a small (positive or negative) or zero spread 
																																																								
18 Using K-P algorithm and two lags, the impulse response shows even an initially negative response after 1985, 
although it turns positive shortly after. 
Figure	A.7.7	–	M1	impulse	response	to	a	F‐D	shock.		Note: Posterior	means.
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between rates, what occurs just after those rates have been in local maximum19. It seems that 
despite this pattern, the Fed extended its purchases a little more during the years of positive 
spread between 1969-1971. In 1990 the almost-zero or zero spread did not avoid Fed’s 
purchases due to the recession. This is in line with Figure A.7.8, as after the 1980s is observed 
that despite having positive spreads in the periods 1986-1990 and 1994-2000, it seems that, 
likewise, the Fed purchased significantly in the open market, as the response of M1 to an OMO 
shock is positive. This could be related to the decrease in borrowing after the 1980s. Figure 
A.7.10 confirms the results of Figure 7.3, as the response of M1 to a discount rate shock is 
positive for the entire period, pointing out that despite the increase in the discount rate, M1 still 
was raising because of the purchases in the open market and increases in borrowing given the 
positive spreads. Both figures share significance for almost the same periods (Figure 8.3). 
Analysing the inflation response to an M1 shock (Figure A.7.11), it is negative almost for the 
whole period, not being the expected result. The negative peaks (except for that between 1960-
1962) occur some time after the maximums of the federal funds rate. Hence, it seems to be 
capturing the following: when there were maximum in the federal funds rate (Figure 1), which 
normally coincided with large spreads, it was when M1 was in its highest levels. Subsequently, 
rates were lowered, because the economy could not endure those high rates and lending 
decreased. However, the higher supply of money was already in the market and it was a matter 
of time that prices increased. When it happened, the money supply had already begun to 
decrease (this is what the model is capturing here), as positive spreads had disappeared, together 
with the decline in borrowing and loans. Thus, the relationship M1-CPI may need more lags to 
capture the right effect. Beyond that possible explanation, the behavior changes after mid-1998. 
Inflation responds positively initially, although after two quarters, it goes to zero or slightly 
negative.  
 
																																																								
19 Although this effect is not clear, as the model estimated with two lags show a negative response, OMO impact 
is more likely to be captured with one lag. Hence, I consider the results with 1 lag more reliable in this case. 
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Figure	A.7.8–	M1	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.7.9–	F‐D	impulse	response	to	an	OMO	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.7.10–	M1	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.7.11–	CPI	Inflation	impulse	response	to	an	M1	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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The response of the IPI to an M1 shock (Figure A.7.12) is initially negative, but after three or 
four quarters the response becomes positive, although this only starts to happen after 
approximately 1966. Subsequently, the initial negative response diminishes until disappearing 
at the end of 1987. After 1995, those initial or belated positive peaks occur when the spread 
was almost zero or negative. Again, the initial negative response could be a delayed effect, 
pointing out the necessity of more lags. 
 Last, the discount rate shock to F-D (Figure A.7.13) has a positive response for the 
whole period, showing that when the Fed increased the discount rate, the federal funds rate 
increased more in relation to the discount rate. The response of OMO to a discount rate (Figure 
A.7.14) shock is negative, as expected. 
 
Figure	A.7.12–	IPI	impulse	response	to	an	M1	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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Figure	A.7.13–	F‐D	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
Figure	A.7.14–	OMO	impulse	response	to	a	discount	rate	shock.	 Note: Posterior	means.
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 Appendix B - Counterfactual methodology 
	
The impulse response analysis for the second period shows that Fed’s instruments, OMO and 
the discount rate, only have a regime switch around 1965. Moreover, the new variable F-D 
seems to present quite a dynamic behavior in relation to inflation, the IPI and M1.  While during 
the 1970s the difference between the discount rate and the federal funds rate was not managed 
adequately as it increased inflation, around 1990, the sign of the response in Figure 7.1 is the 
opposite, negative. Hence, it seems that policies did not change and the banking sector modified 
its behavior. To support this hypothesis and discover whether different policies were applied, 
in this section I carry out a counterfactual analysis. 
 For that task, I have used the posterior mean of the average value of the parameters 
between 1995 and 1999, representing Greenspan’s policies, and between 1971 and 1977 for 
Burns’ policies. These values are used to simulate new ones for the rest of the parameters and 
for the other periods of the sample. Thus, the new values obtained for the parameters can be 
interpreted as those that would have been observed, had those policies been applied to the rest 
of the sample. In this case, unlike other works that draw the average of the posterior distribution 
from the monetary policy rule equation, meaning, the federal funds rate equation, here I draw 
the average values from the OMO, discount rate and F-D equations. In this type of analysis, the 
Lucas’ critique arises as expectations and the private agents’ behavior could have changed, had 
policies been modified at some point. However, given the Bayesian framework, in which policy 
is random and the model presents stochastic time variation of policy, the issue is hugely 
mitigated. Apart from that, I have included a new variable in the model, which is intended to 
capture inflation expectations. A new posterior distribution will be created for this variable 
every time that I introduce the new averaged values from Greenspan or Burns’ policies. Thus, 
new expectations about inflations will be created for each counterfactual exercise. This new 
variable is inspired by Goodfriend (1993, pp.5-6), where he explained that the long-term yields 
should be a sum of the short-term rates with a variation, perhaps between two or three 
percentage points, plus the expected inflation. Thus, when the long-term rates increase more 
than the short-term rates, it is because the inflation expectations are higher. Consequently, the 
variable for the inflation expectations is built as follow: first, I take the difference of the short-
term rate (3-months Treasury Bill rate) between period t and period t-1, and the same is done 
for the long-term rate (10-years government bonds yields). Once I have the difference of both 
rates, I use the difference of those two values. Then, the inflation expectations are captured 
when the long-term rate has increased or decreased more than the short-term rate. This variable 
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is located in the fourth position of the VAR, before M1 and after F-D, as during Volcker and 
Greenspan’s mandate, they targeted long-term rates to control inflation. The results obtained 
are displayed in Figures B.10.1 (Greenspan’s counterfactual) and B.10.2 (Burns’ 
counterfactual). The CPI response to an F-D shock under Burns and Greenspan’s policies are 
very similar. Under Burns’ policies, the positive values are more positive than under 
Greenspan’s policies, and for those periods when the response is negative, Burns’ policies 
would have decreased inflation less. Apart from that, there is not significant difference between 
both figures and I cannot claim a change in Fed’s policies after the 1980s or 1990s, despite 
Figure 7.1 shows a regime change for those years. For the rest of the impulse response analysis, 
figures are all almost identical for both counterfactuals. The same counterfactual was carried 
out with the 1960-1965 parameters, when Martin was the chairman of the Fed, but the results 
are alike. This casts doubts on the possible regime change observed for that period in Figures 
7.2 and 7.3. 
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Figure	B.10.1–	CPI	Inflation	impulse	response	to	a	F‐D	shock (Greenspan).	 Note: Posterior	means.	
Figure	B.10.2–	CPI	Inflation	impulse	response	to	a	F‐D	shock (Burns).	 Note: Posterior	means.	
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Appendix C – Convergence tests I 
	
In this section, convergence of the Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm is assessed for the 
baseline models. First, I present the inefficiency factor (IF), which is the inverse of the relative 
numerical efficiency (RNE) measure developed in Geweke (1992), for the posterior estimates 
of the parameters. RNE is a function of the serial correlation characteristics of the chain. The 
estimate (IF) is performed using a 4% tapered window for the estimation of the spectral density 
at frequency zero. Values below or around 20 can be considered as satisfactory. For space 
reasons results are not presented for the hyperparameters. Also, because they behave better than 
the parameters and all the values are below 20. 
 Second, to reassure that after the initial discarded sample and thinning of the chain 
the sample generated adequately represent the posterior distribution of interest, I calculate the 
I-statistic from Raftery and Lewis (1992b) that measures “the increase in the number of 
iterations due to dependence in the sequence” (Raftery and Lewis, 1992a). It is obtained from 
the formula (M+N)/Nmin, where M is the initial number of iterations that should be discarded, 
N the number of iterations stored and required to achieve certain precision, and Nmin the 
minimum number of iterations to reach convergence (Raftery and Lewis, 1992a). In this case, 
I apply it to the sample already “cleaned”, so that I can evaluate if more iterations are needed, 
burned or it needs more “thinning”. Those numbers are calculated for the quantile 0.025 of the 
posterior distribution of the parameters, estimated to within േ0.005 with probability 0.95. That 
is, 95% intervals with posterior probability between 0.94 and 0.96. Values greater than 5 
indicate dependence problems. Again, and for the same reasons as for the IF, the figures are 
presented only for the parameters. Figure C.11.1 and Figure C.11.2 display the results for the 
parameters B, α, and σ for the interwar period, and Figure C.12.1 and Figure C.12.2 for the 
second period. 
 In general, all the parameters reach convergence for the number of iterations 
indicated in section 4.1, as their values are below 20 for the IF estimate and below 5 for the I-
statistic. Although the convergence of the Bs for the interwar period with K-P algorithm is not 
as good as for the other parameters, the IF estimate has a mean of 28.062, which can be 
considered as satisfactory. Regarding the I-statistic, only a few values are higher than 5. 
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Figure C.11.1 – IF estimate for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Figure C.11.2– I-statistic for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Figure C.12.1– IF estimate for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Figure C.12.2 – I-statistic for parameters B (Panel 1), α (Panel 2), and σ (Panel 3) 
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Appendix D – Historical context 
 
The first step to discover or correct the potential mechanisms whereby monetary policy operates 
is to review the Federal Reserve’s history. This review is necessary to gain insight regarding 
the learning process of those responsible for monetary policy, Fed’s responses to economic and 
political events, and the general beliefs or conclusions regarding how those responses have 
determined the path of the American economy. Several authors have invested their time and 
effort in providing that insight. Fforde (1954), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Wheelock 
(1991), Toma (1997), Moore (1990) and Mayer (1999) are some of them. However, according 
to the level of completeness (from a personal opinion), I have decided to expose mostly those 
facts narrated in Meltzer (2003, 2009) and Hetzel (2008), but without positioning on whether 
the facts narrated are correct or not, from an ideological perspective.  
 
1.1 1919-1939 
By 1919, governor Benjamin Strong, chairman of the Fed of New York, realised that the spread 
between the short-term rates and the discount rate would avoid a decline in inflation, as it was 
profitable for banks to borrow at lower rates and lend.  In 1921 began what today is known as 
the federal funds market. Banks with surplus reserves sold reserves to banks with deficient 
reserves. However, its relevance was far from what that market is nowadays. By 1922, some 
members of the Fed noted that reserve banks could increase “momentum” purchasing in the 
open market and at the same time reducing the discount rate. Strong claimed that buying in the 
open market was equivalent to a member bank borrowing. Thus, open market operations 
experiments began in 1922. The discount rate during those years was at discretion of each 
Reserve Bank and its use was intended to be a penalty rate. Thus, it used to be above short-term 
rates, at least until 1921-1922, because later, market rates on commercial paper started to be 
above the discount rate. Apart from that, it was supposed to be the tool to follow the gold 
standard rules, namely, increasing it in periods of surplus and decreasing it when there was 
deficit. Also in 1922, Strong noted and commented what would determine monetary policy for 
the next years. His observation was that when banks were in debt, they used their surplus 
reserves to reduce borrowing. On the contrary, when they were out of debt, they reduced rates 
and put their surplus to work. “The reduction in our rate had no influence in the market. It was 
the competition to lend money that did it” (Meltzer 2003, p. 126). Thus, changes in the discount 
rate were supposed to be ineffective, but by selling in the open market, the Reserve Banks could 
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reduce bank reserves and force them to borrow, thereby restoring the effectiveness of the 
discount policy. In 1964 Burgess reported:  
 
“First, as fast as the Reserve Banks bought government securities in the market, member 
banks paid off more of their borrowing; and, as a result, earning asset and earnings of 
the Reserve Bank remained unchanged…” (Meltzer 2003 p.153). 
 
 Given Fed’s concern about speculative credit during the 1920s, interest rates were raised 
to avoid the growth of stock exchange lending, thereby attracting more gold. Consequently, to 
maintain price stability, the Fed sterilized the gold inflows and the monetary expansions 
triggered by those gold inflows were reduced or totally cancelled. One characteristic of these 
years that led Federal Reserve Banks to follow the wrong policy is explained in what was the 
Riefler-Burgess doctrine. It was believed that banks were reluctant to borrow and they only did 
it when their reserves were deficient. This triggered that during many years the monetary base 
and borrowing moved procyclically. That is, the Fed believed that increased aggregate 
borrowing signalled a restrictive policy even if the monetary base and money stock accelerated. 
Following this reasoning, it increased the purchases in the open market and decreased the 
discount rate for those periods, and did just the opposite when borrowing decreased. 
  
 At the April 1925 meeting for the Governors Conference, the concern that would 
continue for the rest of the decade was expressed; credit to securities brokers and dealers. They 
feared speculative borrowing. Consequently, some Reserve Banks increased the discount rate 
later, as the open market account was thought to be too small to have a significant effect on 
reducing bank reserves. The Fed carried out open market purchases in May 1927 because of 
the recession, and continued in July. However, they were offset by a decline in borrowing and 
in the reported gold stock. Despite the increase in inflation in 1926, Strong’s view of supporting 
the pound with lower rates dominated.  By the end of 1927 Strong had complete authorization 
to offset gold flows without limit. From 1927 to 1929 the Fed sterilized gold inflows, preventing 
monetary expansions and triggering, or at least adding to the deflation witnessed for those years. 
In addition, the members of the Fed were misled by the lower levels of discounts and borrowing, 
as commented above, believing that policy was already expansive.  Apart from that, during this 
period the discount rate was higher in real terms given the levels of deflation, but they did not 
distinguish between real and nominal terms. Moreover, the spread between the stock exchange 
call loans rate and the discount rate became significantly large after the beginning of 1928. 
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Given the increase in credit to brokers, the Fed thought that its policies were expansive and 
therefore, rates were not reduced and open market purchases decreased. During 1928, the 
Federal Reserve offset part of the net gold outflow, but it was insufficient and the monetary 
base declined. Thus, when New York stopped sterilizing gold losses, discounting increased 
significantly but the monetary base continued falling. Discounting and bank credit were in the 
highest levels of the three last years. 
 
 “…[O]n December 31, 1928, the Board adopted a resolution that  blamed the spread 
between discount rates and rates for stock exchange loans for the temptation to borrow from 
the Fed and lend to help buy or carry securities” (Meltzer 2003, p. 237). The Fed spent 1929 
trying to reduce bank lending to brokers, as it was thought to be speculative credit, but most of 
the lending came from corporations and other nonbanks. Hence, the Fed was not successful in 
reducing call loan rates. Previous to the crash on October 23, call loan rates had already started 
to decrease and by that date, they were around 6%. However, the Fed refused to reduce the 
discount rate. At the end of November 1929 the Fed noted that there was being a liquidation of 
credit against securities, what could suppose a serious threat to business stability, having 
already in mind that there were indications of a business recession. As the short-term rates had 
fallen and were expected to fall further, and discounting increased, the Fed approved limited 
purchases in the open market. Later, industrial production, stock of money, monetary base and 
borrowing fell. Fed governors thought that the open market purchases had failed to revive the 
economy. Actually, the Fed had failed to offset the decline in borrowing by purchasing 
insufficiently. However, the members of the Fed thought that the purchases had already 
permitted banks to repay borrowing, as borrowing levels had declined. Bank failures along with 
the increasing demand of the public for currency, contributed to contracting the money supply. 
 
 By the end of 1930, Fed’s members were deliberating how much to sell in the open 
market as they considered that policy was loose, since banks were keeping twice the level of 
excess reserves of the previous year. This offset the inflow of gold at the beginning of the year. 
Later, as those inflows did not decrease interest rates, the governors decided to purchase in the 
open market from April to June of 1931. Nonetheless, the rise in currency holding and excess 
reserve counteracted the effect. In 1932, gold outflow started again, along with a higher demand 
for currency. The Glass-Steagall Act of April 1932 and threats of additional legislation led the 
Fed to purchase in the open market. Signs of improvements were soon recognized but as the 
purchases stopped, the improvements quickly disappeared and gold outflow continued. 
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Accordingly, it was thought that the program has failed. As already occurred between 1927-
1929, since the short-term rates were historically low, the members of the Fed thought that 
policy was easy and no further purchases were done. However, because of the deflation, real 
rates were higher. The System kept an inactive role during the next months. From time to time, 
as in January 1933, the System sold in the open market to keep excess reserves close to $500 
million. In the beginning of 1933 short-term rates increased, but the Fed failed by discounting 
at higher rates than the market, when it should have set the discount rate below the short-term 
rates.  
 
 The last part of the interwar period, from 1933 to 1941 is characterized by the inaction 
of the Fed, as the Treasury took most of the responsibility for monetary policy. The Fed’s open 
market account and the discount rate hardly changed during this period, and the variations in 
the monetary base were due to changes in gold stock and the devaluation of the dollar in 1934. 
Marriner S. Eccles, who became governor of the Board in 1934 believed that the Fed should 
keep market rates low, in order to facilitate private spending and government finance. Also, he 
thought that the growing volume of reserves at member banks could mean a threat of future 
inflation. Thus, reserve requirement ratios became the main instrument of the Fed during these 
years. In October and November of 1933 the Fed made the last purchases in the open market 
and it would not purchase again until April 1937.  
 
  In 1934, Roosevelt bought gold and silver to raise prices. The base and money stock 
increased. Also that year, he carried out devaluation up to 60% of the gold. As the president 
had acquired the gold held by the Federal Reserve banks previously, this devaluation supposed 
a $2 billion profit, which was used to set up the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). It aimed 
to retire national banknotes and finance industrial loans. This devaluation supposed an increase 
in prices and flow of gold into the country. The ESF was also used to buy bonds, in order to 
keep rates low and finance the deficit. In August 1935, as excess reserves rose and there was 
fear of future inflation, the Fed decided to increase the reserve requirements ratio. As reserves 
had increased, discounting decreased and hence, the discount rate could exert little influence, 
or at least the members of the Fed thought so. This first increase in the reserve requirement ratio 
had little effect because of the gold inflow. Given the fear of speculative gold inflows and 
increase in the monetary base, the Treasury sterilized gold inflows between December 1936 
and July 1937. Just in this period, deflation appeared again. There were two further increases 
in the reserves requirement ratio in January and May of 1936. Later, and together with the 
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sterilization, there was an increase in bond yields, what supposed the restart of the Fed’s 
purchases in the open market to lower short-term rates and indirectly, long-term rates. The 
increases in the reserves requirement ratio along with contractive fiscal policies supposedly 
made the money stock to fall, causing a recession by May of 1937. Thus, in September 1937 
more open market purchases were undertaken and the Treasury desterilized part of the gold 
inflows. Consequently, inflation levels increased for the end of the year.  Around that time, the 
Fed proposed to manage open market operations (OMO, henceforth) in response to the level of 
excess reserves instead of the amount of borrowing. Thus, by 1938 the Fed’s purchases in the 
open market were in small quantities, also because rates were low and it was believed that the 
monetary policy was easy. However, deflation came back again for the end of the year and the 
Fed had to reduce reserve requirements ratios, while the Treasury continued desterilizing the 
gold sterilized for the previous years.  
 
1.2 1950-1957 
The main characteristics of monetary policy from 1950 to 1960 were that the Fed still 
considered low interest rates as loose policy, even though M1 be decreasing; the gain in 
relevance in the use of OMO in relation to discounting, and that the main target was free 
reserves, using bank borrowing as an indicator. Money growth did not receive attention despite 
it was thought to cause inflation in the long run. Still, they did not differentiate between real 
and nominal rates and continued applying procyclical policies. In 1952 banks borrowed 
relatively large amounts from the discount window, taking advantage of the spread between the 
open market rates and the discount rate. In 1954 the federal funds market emerged again, as it 
had been inactive since the late 1920s. 
 
 Regarding discount rate policies the following is found. “At the August 23 1955 FOMC 
meeting Martin raised two issues: whether the discount rate should be a penalty rate, and 
whether it should lead or follow market rates… Following the meeting… in mid-September; 
the discount rate was a penalty rate” (Meltzer 2009a, pp. 127-128).  
 Later, “The Board reconsidered the role of discounting in its 1957 Annual Report… The 
Board, at last, recognized that when one bank repaid its borrowing, another might be forced to 
borrow, so that aggregate reserves did not decline. And it recognized that increased borrowing 
offset open market sales and that the attitude of member banks toward operation with borrowed 
resources varies from bank to bank…  The Board found no conflict between discounting and 
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open market operations. Market and discount rates were interdependent. By raising the discount 
rate above the market rate, the System encouraged banks to adjust by selling securities instead 
of discounting. Short-term rates rose, reinforcing an open market policy of sales” (Meltzer 
2009a, p. 78).   
1.3 1958-1970 
 
 Already for the period under analysis, there was a recession in 1957-1958. In 1958, the 
president asked to make price stability an explicit goal of economic policy. The Great Inflation 
was underway during the 1960s, sustained by rapid money growth to finance the government 
budget and government spending for the Vietnam War. One of the Fed’s problems during this 
period was that it acted to reduce inflation only until unemployment rose. Given the 
unpopularity of inflation since 1965, emphasis shifted between those two goals.  
 
 Free reserves were increasing in 1960 and the Fed interpreted it as easy policy. As the 
economy slowed, discount rates decreased and free reserves and federal funds rate rose. During 
1961-1962, the free reserves target was questioned and for the first time there was a target for 
the T-bill rate. On January 1962, an increase in deposit ceiling rates was approved. When the 
Fed began to control interest rates during those years, the problem was that they contained less 
information about the market position. “Instead of the market being a window through which 
we can observe indications of private actions that might call for policy changes, we have made 
it—in part at least—a mirror of our own intentions with respect to rates” (Meltzer 2009a, p.429). 
In 1963 the free reserve target was abandoned and more attention was dedicated to the federal 
funds rate and less to the T-bill rate. In early 1965, the first of several errors to control inflation 
was made, when the president’s Economic Report announced the need for further expansion, 
even though signs of strength had already appeared.  The same year, the federal funds rate 
became again higher than the discount rate. Since the Fed targeted a short-term rate, to prevent 
a change on it when the deficit increased, the Fed had to allow the monetary base to increase. 
Fiscal policy contributed to inflation with the president Johnson’s large deficits in 1967-1968. 
Before Martin left the Fed in January 1970, the Fed had adopted growth money as a policy 
indicator and instructed the manager to change money market conditions if money growth 
deviated from a 2% annual rate. When Burns became chairman of the Fed, the manager in 
charge of OMO lost much of his autonomy and the “tone and feel policy” ended forever. Money 
growth became the target and the FOMC would take decisions based on a total reserves target. 
Money and bank credit growth were used as target rather than as projection, meaning, the 
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manager would change the federal funds rate when he missed the target. As the procedure began 
raising federal funds rate, the System ended up supplying more reserves, in part to prevent the 
failure of the Treasury financing.  Thus, the FOMC soon gave up on monetary control. Higher 
rates supposed higher unemployment, and Burns disliked the result. By August 2, wage and 
price controls were imposed. Also the gold window was closed, and the currency was allowed 
to float. 
 “In short, the simple Keynesian model as applied in the late 1960s had three major flaws. 
It did not generally distinguish between nominal and real interest rate changes. It presumed that 
the government could permanently reduce the unemployment rate by permitting the inflation 
rate to rise. And it did not distinguish between one-time price level changes and maintained 
rates of price change. Each of these errors continued throughout the 1970s” (Meltzer 2009a, 
p.490). 
1.4 1971-1980 
This decade started with a freeze in prices and later, in interest rates, rates charged on 
mortgages, and consumer credit. Burns believed that in order to achieve full recovery without 
inflation, it was necessary to increase profits and lower wages growth, as it was understood that 
cost-push by unions was causing inflation. Another three phases of price controls were extended 
until 1973. Although in the beginning they decreased inflation, once finished, inflation 
increased even more. In the end, the public lost credibility on these controls. 
During these years, it was usual to target growth in monetary and credit aggregates, setting at 
the same time lower and upper bounds on the federal funds rate. Before the elections in 1972, 
it is said that Burns was pressured by the government to increase growth and decrease 
unemployment. Once the elections passed and the administration loosed price and wage control, 
there was an inflationary outbreak due to those expansionary policies. In 1973, member bank 
borrowing rose to levels not reached since 1921 and the discount rate rose only in August 1973. 
Again, due to positive the spread between the discount rate and federal funds rate from 1972 to 
1975. The Fed was also targeting the growth of reserves against private deposits during this 
period. The procedure contributed to increasing inflation as the staff estimated the growth of 
reserves and the level of federal funds rate consistent with the desired growth of money. Several 
times, they did not match and the band on federal funds rate had to be changed. In the end, the 
manager maintained the federal funds rate and exceeded the reserve target. As inflation 
increased, the federal funds rate and the discount rate reached levels never seen before. 
However, such was the spread between both rates that member bank borrowing increased 
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significantly, contributing to the growth of the monetary base. It seems that along with the 
excessive monetary and fiscal expansion of 1972, the removal of price controls in 1973, the 
devaluation of the dollar after 1971, poor harvest abroad and the increases in oil prices, added 
to the rise in inflation. Beginning in 1975, borrowing declined and the federal funds rate came 
down rapidly. The FOMC continued using the federal funds rate as it principal target during 
this decade. “This period is unique in that the Fed controlled the funds rate so closely that 
market participants could identify most changes in the funds rate target on the day they were 
first implemented by the Fed, and these changes were reported by the market participants in the 
financial press the following day” (Meltzer 2009b, p. 892).  
 
 By October 1978, inflation had become a political issue as public opinion saw it as a 
major problem. In December 1978, the oil-producing countries decided to raise prices again. 
Inside the FOMC, more arguments appeared regarding how to control inflation and how this 
could reduce employment at the same time. Other concern was that the lack of credibility was 
damaging the effect of raising the federal funds rate, as the public expected that the Fed would 
not continue its restrictive policies and prices would increase again. Mark Willes claimed: 
 
 “We can in fact have less inflation without more unemployment in 1980 if we have policies 
in 1979 that are…firmly held to so that people really believe we are going to follow through 
on them (FOMC Minutes, February 6, 1979, 19)” (Meltzer 2009b, p.940).  
1.5 1980-1990 
In August 1979, Volcker became chairman of the Fed. At his confirmation he already 
distinguished between real and nominal interest rates and expressed inflation as his main 
concern. He, following Milton Friedman, accepted that inflation could not be reduced unless 
money growth declined relative to growth of real output. The FOMC used a federal funds rate 
target and announced objectives for growth of M1 and M2 to reduce money growth. For that 
task, Volcker targeted nonborrowed reserves. However, they also paid attention to total reserves 
to move the target for nonborrowed reserves. “Monetarists criticized the procedures at the time, 
arguing that they made both interest rates and money growth more volatile. Growth of the 
money stock depends on reserve growth (or the monetary base). By holding to a fixed value (or 
growth) of nonborrowed reserves, banks had to borrow any deficiency to meet required reserves 
on deposits outstanding two weeks earlier, thereby increasing total reserves. …Further, keeping 
the discount rate as a penalty rate slightly above the average federal funds rate, would reduce 
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borrowing. Most often, the Fed subsidized borrowing in 1979-82 by allowing a wide spread, 4 
or 5%, between the average federal funds rate and the discount rate. This encouraged borrowing 
and weakened control of money” (Meltzer 2009b, p. 1028). 
 
 The attitude change on the FOMC was apparent once despite the recession of 1980, it 
favoured slower money growth. However, although by March the discount rate was raised, the 
action was insufficient and late. Heavy borrowing continued because of the subsidy of around 
4 percentage points. Twelve years after Friedman’s insistence on the effect of expectations, the 
Fed accepted that it could not permanently reduce unemployment by increasing inflation. Now, 
it was claimed that low inflation increased employment. The recession of 1980 and the posterior 
decrease in the discount rate in July avoided that the credibility on the Fed augmented. Policy 
tightened sharply in the spring of 1981, when the FOMC continued increasing the federal funds 
rate despite the recession and the unemployment rate near 8% in the fall. Market participants 
recognized that the Fed was fighting inflation. Thus, credibility increased. This was a turning 
point. By October, CPI inflation decreased quickly. The speed of the fall surprised the Fed. In 
part, it was ameliorated by the dollar appreciation undergone from 1980 to 1985. In 1982, the 
FOMC finished targeting nonborrowed reserves, and Volcker clearly began to shift to an 
interest rate target. He did not trust on M1 anymore: 
  
“On these money growth targets, in substance, I don’t care. I think either of these two 
sets of numbers [5.5 and 6.5%] will make no difference, virtually, in what we actually 
do… [W]e are within the limits of the growth targets anyway”. (Meltzer 2009b, p. 1114).  
 
“I, frankly, cannot live in these circumstances, given what is going on in the money 
markets, with violent moves in short-term rates in either direction. It would just be so 
disturbing in terms of expectations, market psychology, and fragility that it’s just the 
wrong policy, period, during this particular period.” (Meltzer 2009b, p.1115) 
 
 Shortly later, Volcker targeted borrowing to around $500-$600 million to prevent a raise 
in the interest rate. Thus, the System returned to the target used in 1920s and the basis for the 
free reserves target in the 1950s and 1960s. Policy became discretionary based on Volcker’s 
judgment. Despite inflation had decreased significantly by the end of 1982, it was still high and 
again, created skepticism about the Fed’s purpose of reducing it. In 1983-1984, long-term rates 
increased again. Consequently, inflationary expectations proxied by bond rates replaced money 
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as intermediate target. Later, Greenspan concerns and focus on shaping the expectational 
environment would turn Volcker’s experiment into a new monetary standard. A renewed rise 
in bond rates in the spring of 1984 tested Fed’s compromise to fight inflationary expectations. 
Again, in 1984, Morris pointed out that the differential between the federal funds rate and the 
discount rate was of 2 percentage points and borrowing had reached $1 billion. He proposed to 
increase the discount rate 1 percentage point but Volcker replied that it would mean “an 
explosion in Washington”. Thus, during those years, many increases in the discount rate were 
not undertaken because of the pressure from the administration. When Greenspan replaced 
Volcker in August 1987, he set a narrow band around a federal funds rate target, which was 
adjustable depending on inflation and stable growth. In 1987, there was another inflation scare 
due to the depreciation of the dollar. 
1.6 1990-2007 
After the recession in 1990, the FOMC followed a “soft recovery” strategy and Greenspan 
focused on reducing expected inflation by reducing bond rates rather than just focusing on them 
during inflation scares. However, inflation concerns appeared in mid-1990 when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait and oil prices raised. Another inflation scare was faced in the beginning of 1993, but 
the Fed kept raising the federal funds rate during the next months until February 1995. “By the 
end of the decade, financial market had stopped associating high real growth with a resurgence 
of inflation. The Fed had defeated the “bond market vigilantes”” (Hetzel 2008, p. 205). By 
1998, falling unemployment rate and low inflation created expectations about an increase in the 
federal funds rate. Nonetheless, low world growth perspectives led to lower the federal funds 
rate. Thus, the FOMC exacerbated an unsustainable rise in equity prices. From mid-1997 
through mid-1999, the FOMC changed its procedures and raised rates when resource utilization 
rates were high. Greenspan believed that monetary policy should counter irrational 
expectations. He did not increase the federal funds rate again until February 2000 because he 
did not consider inflation as a threat. He believed that productivity growth was restraining 
inflation. As inflation and unemployment fell together after 1995, Greenspan explained: 
 
“The lack of pricing leverage has once again concentrated the minds of business people 
on the need to increase productivity… [E]conomic experience appears to be running full 
circle, back to the early 1960s: a period of low-inflation and strong productivity growth 
…[L]ower inflation historically has been associated…with faster growth of 
productivity… Lower inflation and inflation expectations reduce uncertainty in 
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economic planning and diminish risk premiums for capital investment” (Hetzel 2008, 
p.231).  
 
 After the Asian financial crisis, the FOMC began to raise the federal funds rate. The 
equity market began its rise in 1995 until its peak in early 2000. After that peak, the NASDAQ 
began a prolonged fall after September 2000 and investors lost a significant amount of wealth. 
Consumption growth rates fell and the economy weakened. In January 2001, the Fed decreased 
rates, slowly and late. Thus, policy was contractionary by then. In 2001, policy followed the 
lean-against-the-wind pattern, whereby the FOMC raised (lowered) the funds rate in a 
persistent, measured way if the economy grew above (below) trend. The characterization for 
the last years of the Greenspan era is that the FOMC pursued its basic expected inflation/growth 
gap procedures but raised its implicit inflation target from price stability to low inflation.  
	
	
